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PREVENTIVE CRIMINALIZAT ION
Andrew Cornford*
The criminal laws of many states make increasing use of preventive offenses—
offenses that aim to prevent a given type of harm by targeting conduct prior
to the causation of that harm. Academic commentators have largely been
skeptical about such offenses. Their most potent criticism is that many pre-
ventive offenses do not target culpable wrongdoing of a kind that warrants
censure and punishment through the criminal law. This article responds to
this argument. Its principal contention is that some preventive offenses may be
rationalized as targeting regulatory or malum prohibitum wrongs. Even if
conduct does not yet cause or risk causing harm, it may warrant penalization
as part of a regulatory scheme aimed at preventing that harm. This is shown to
have signiﬁcant implications for the legitimacy of some offenses targeted by
the skeptics—in particular, offenses targeting the possession of weapons such as
knives or ﬁrearms.
Keywords: criminalization, prevention, preparatory offenses, possession
offenses
I N TRODUCT ION
A familiar tension exists between the preventive ambitions of the criminal
law and its retributive character. This article explores this tension in the
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Chloe¨ Kennedy, Alan Norrie, Victor Tadros, three anonymous reviewers, and the Review’s
editor, Roger Levesque. Initial work on the article was funded by the U.K. Arts and
Humanities Research Council, whose support is gratefully acknowledged.
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context of an increasingly signiﬁcant family of offenses, which one might
call preventive offenses. Like many other criminal offenses, these offenses
aim to prevent a given type of harm—whether through deterrence or
through the enforcement powers that they afford. Unlike more familiar
offenses, however, they do not target conduct that directly causes the harm
that they aim to prevent. Rather, they target conduct prior to the causation
of that harm, thereby attempting to improve on the preventive potential of
the law’s traditional forms.
Although there is a sizeable literature addressing the place of preventive
rationales within criminal justice generally, this issue has only recently been
explored in the context of the substantive criminal law.1 This article aims to
build on this recent work in two ways. First, it clariﬁes and reconstructs one
line of argument for skepticism about preventive offenses: viz, that many of
them do not target culpable wrongdoing of a kind that warrants censure
and punishment through the criminal law. Second, it responds to this
argument. Its principal contention is that there are some kinds of preven-
tive offense—speciﬁcally, preventive offenses that play a regulatory role,
such as offenses of weapon possession—for which there is a stronger case
than the skeptics have acknowledged.
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section I introduces some examples
of preventive offenses, and explains why academic commentators have been
skeptical about them. Section II then reconstructs one line of argument for
such skepticism. This argument relies on the claim that criminal offenses
may only target speciﬁc kinds of prelegal wrongdoing: in its most plausible
rendition, those that impose risks of harm on others. Section III then
argues that this claim is false, because of the existence of regulatory or
malum prohibitum wrongs. One may do wrong by breaching a regulation
aimed at preventing some harm, even when the conduct concerned does
not risk causing that harm. Furthermore, at least some existing preventive
1. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Just Prevention: Preventive Rationales and
the Limits of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 279
(R.A. Duff & S.P. Green eds., 2011); Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Prevention and
Criminalization: Justiﬁcations and Limits, 15 N. CRIM. L. REV. 542 (2012); DOUGLAS
HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, ch. 3 (2007); PETER RAMSAY, THE INSECURITY STATE
(2012); A.P. SIMESTER & ANDREAS VON HIRSCH, CRIMES, HARMS AND WRONGS, chs. 4
& 5 (2011); SEEKING SECURITY: PRE-EMPTING THE COMMISSION OF CRIMINAL HARMS, esp.
chs. 3–6 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012); Victor Tadros, Crimes and Security, 71
MOD. L. REV. 940 (2008).
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offenses are plausibly justiﬁable in this manner. Finally, section IV argues
that the criminal law can be a legitimate form of regulation in these cases,
even though other kinds of legal response are available. Although we may
lack strong reasons to censure the conduct targeted by the relevant offenses,
we may have reasons to penalize it that justify our choice of criminalization
over other regulatory tools.
I . I N TRODUC ING PREVENT IVE OFFENSES
What sorts of offenses should be classiﬁed as ‘‘preventive’’? Given the
notorious difﬁculties of determining legislative intent—and hence of deter-
mining which offenses actually have preventive aims—one might think
that it would prove difﬁcult to answer this question. In the literature,
however, preventive offenses are commonly identiﬁed with nonconsummate
or nonconstitutive offenses.2 These are offenses whose commission does not
entail culpably harming another. They are classiﬁed as preventive because
they target conduct that is, by deﬁnition, prior to the causation of the harm
that they aim to prevent. Thus deﬁned, the category of preventive offenses
is broad and includes many familiar types of crime. For example, it includes
the general inchoate offenses of attempt, conspiracy, and incitement. It
includes offenses of assisting and encouraging crime.3 It also includes
several familiar kinds of speciﬁc offense, for example, offenses of risk impo-
sition, such as offenses of reckless endangerment or of dangerous or careless
driving.
The growth of interest in this ﬁeld, however, has mostly been prompted
by more recent legislative innovations. Many criminal offenses now target
conduct that is even more remote from any ultimate harm than the familiar
offenses just listed. Perhaps the most familiar examples of such offenses are
preparatory offenses. Preparatory offenses are offenses targeting conduct
that is of itself harmless and noncriminal, but that is performed with the
further intention or purpose of committing a complete offense. Typically,
the function of such offenses is to catch conduct at earlier stages of criminal
plots than traditional offenses of attempt. For a textbook example, consider
2. See, e.g., Ashworth & Zedner, Prevention and Criminalization, supra note 1, at 546;
HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 1, at 160.
3. English law, for example, now includes general offenses of assisting and encouraging
crime that are deﬁned in the inchoate mode: Serious Crime Act 2007 §§ 44–46.
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the Model Penal Code offense of possessing an instrument of crime. This
offense is relatively general in character and is not aimed at any speciﬁc
criminal threat: one commits it if one ‘‘possesses any instrument of crime
with purpose to employ it criminally.’’4
Many other preparatory offenses, by contrast, have been responses to
more speciﬁc preventive concerns. Again, many of these take the form of
possession offenses; for instance, legislation might target the possession of
counterfeiting equipment as a means of preventing forgery.5 However,
other ostensibly ‘‘innocent’’ action types may also be criminal when per-
formed with a speciﬁc criminal intent. Consider, for example, the offenses
created in a number of jurisdictions to deal with ‘‘grooming’’ of children for
sexual purposes. These offenses criminalize such conduct as arranging
meetings, communicating with children, or sharing their contact details,
where this is performed for the purpose of committing a relevant sexual
offense against a child.6
A further example is legislation designed to deal with the threat of
terrorism. This has been the source of probably the greatest innovations
in the contemporary development of preventive offenses. Many jurisdic-
tions have widened the scope of criminal liability in relation to terrorism,
expanding it far beyond the traditional boundaries of inchoate and acces-
sorial liability.7 Again, preparatory offenses have been one component of
this expansion. Legislation in the United Kingdom, for instance, has intro-
duced very broad offenses of preparing acts of terrorism,8 of possessing
articles for terrorist purposes,9 and of possessing information of a kind likely
to be useful for terrorist purposes.10 But a wide range of other kinds of
preventive offense have also been introduced in this context. For example,
4. Model Penal Code § 5.06(1).
5. See, e.g., Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 §§ 5, 17 (UK).
6. In U.K. law, see, e.g., Sexual Offences Act 2003 § 15. In the U.S., see, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2422(b), 2425.
7. The discussion here focuses on the law of the United States and the United
Kingdom. For discussion of similar developments in other jurisdictions, see, e.g., Ber-
nadette McSherry, Expanding the Boundaries of Inchoate Crimes: the Growing Reliance on
Preparatory Offenses, in REGULATING DEVIANCE 141 (Bernadette McSherry et al, eds.,
2009), discussing Australia; Kent Roach, The New Terrorism Offences in Canadian Criminal
Law, in TERRORISM, LAW AND DEMOCRACY 113 (David Daubney et al. eds., 2002).
8. Terrorism Act 2006 § 5.
9. Terrorism Act 2000 § 57.
10. Terrorism Act 2000 § 58.
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contribution to others’ potential terrorist actions has been criminalized,
including through offenses of encouraging and ‘‘glorifying’’ terrorism (in
the U.K.)11 and of providing ‘‘material support or resources’’ to prospective
terrorists (in the U.S.).12 Further offenses criminalize still less direct sorts of
involvement, for example, membership in terrorist organizations13 and
involvement in ﬁnancial arrangements that support terrorist activity.14
Several of these provisions will be explored in greater detail below. Here,
just one further example will be mentioned—an example that is particu-
larly notorious amongst scholars of U.K. criminal law. This is the offense of
breaching a preventive order. Preventive orders are notionally civil injunc-
tions that target unwelcome but not necessarily criminal conduct. They
may typically contain any condition that a court deems necessary to pre-
vent further instances of that conduct. Breach of those conditions is then
criminalized. The seminal example of a preventive order is the Anti-Social
Behaviour Order, or ASBO, which was introduced to deal with neighbor-
hood nuisance and disorder.15 However, the same basic model has since
been adapted to deal with a variety of other perceived threats, among them,
sexual predation, alcohol-related violence, and serious organized crime.16
The recent rise of offenses like these has met with almost overwhelming
skepticism from academic commentators. There are many good reasons for
this. For instance, one particularly urgent concern with preventive offenses
is their impact on civil liberties and human rights. By extending the scope
of criminal liability in relation to ultimate harms, these offenses afford
increased security from those harms. But they also tend to decrease citizens’
security from state coercion, and thereby to restrict their liberties. In
a political climate where the pursuit of security is prioritized, much crim-
inal legislation has probably failed to strike a satisfactory balance between
these two concerns.
11. Terrorism Act 2006 § 1. Closely related is the offense of disseminating terrorist
publications: Terrorism Act 2006 § 2.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A.
13. For discussion, see Liat Levanon, Criminal Prohibitions on Membership in Terrorist
Organizations, 15 N. CRIM. L. REV. 224 (2010).
14. See, e.g., Terrorism Act 2000 §§ 15–19 (UK); 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (US).
15. Crime and Disorder Act 1998 § 1.
16. For a comprehensive discussion, see Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Preventive
Orders: a Problem of Under-Criminalization? in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
59 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010).
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For the most part, however, the skeptics have not relied primarily on this
kind of argument.17 Rather, they have a further objection that is potentially
decisive against many preventive offenses: that these offenses target con-
duct that does not, as a matter of principle, warrant censure and punish-
ment through the criminal law. Consider, for example, the work of Andrew
Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, who have been perhaps the most vocal critics
of the preventive turn in the criminal law.18 For Ashworth and Zedner,
prevention is both an important function of criminal justice and a legiti-
mate ground for criminalization. They are concerned, however, that a focus
on prevention distracts attention from the criminal law’s censuring and
punitive character. This concern does not arise in relation to traditional
‘‘core’’ offenses of directly and culpably harming others. Culpable harming,
Ashworth and Zedner write,
is assumed to be the paradigmatic form of the major criminal offenses, such
as murder, rape and robbery . . .Although such offenses are clearly ‘‘res-
ponses’’ to wrongs, declaring such conduct to be criminal may also be seen as
part of the state’s general responsibility for the prevention of harm.19
One cannot say the same, by contrast, of the newer kinds of offense just
considered. Beyond the paradigm case of culpable harming, justiﬁcations
for criminalization are ‘‘predominantly preventive.’’20 This does not nec-
essarily render such offenses illegitimate: preventive offenses might yet be
‘‘responses to wrongs.’’ But the focus on prevention is problematic, for it
‘‘sidelines normative questions about the degree of censure . . . justiﬁably
imposed upon those who have yet to do any wrongful harm.’’21
Importantly, however, the culpable harm paradigm is not merely of
heuristic signiﬁcance for Ashworth and Zedner. In other passages, it ac-
quires inherent, normative weight. For example:
17. For a notable exception, see Tadros, Crimes and Security, supra note 1.
18. This article draws mainly on Ashworth & Zedner, Just Prevention and Prevention and
Criminalization, both supra note 1. However, both authors have developed their views on
this and related topics in many places and over several years. For the culmination of their
recent, joint work in this area, see generally ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA ZEDNER,
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE (2014).
19. Ashworth & Zedner, Prevention and Criminalization, supra note 1, at 544.
20. Id. at 546.
21. Id. at 555.
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To acknowledge the desirability, even the necessity, of prevention is not
tantamount to providing a sufﬁcient ground for criminalization. Crimi-
nalizing such conduct [i.e., the conduct targeted by preventive offenses]
should involve punishing people for wrongs—wrongs done by threatening or
risking harms. Because criminalization entails the imposition of public
censure and the inﬂiction of the pains of punishment, it requires special, one
might say stronger, justiﬁcation.22
The words emphasized here suggest that remoteness of an ultimate harm
from the conduct targeted by an offense is not merely likely to be prob-
lematic. It is inherently problematic, because criminal wrongs are funda-
mentally wrongs of harming—or at least, of risking harm.23 Thus,
Ashworth and Zedner write elsewhere that ‘‘the more remote the prohib-
ited conduct is from the causation of the harm [i.e., the harm to be
prevented], the weaker the argument for criminalization.’’24
Other commentators are similarly concerned about the retributive cre-
dentials of nonconsummate offenses. Doug Husak, for example, describes
the criminal law’s ‘‘increasing tendency to proscribe conduct that poses
a risk of harm’’ as ‘‘morally problematic.’’25 He is alarmed that ‘‘risk pre-
vention’’ offenses frequently require ‘‘no culpability whatever with respect
to the harm to be prevented.’’26 For him,
It is not enough that the performance of the proscribed conduct just hap-
pens to make the occurrence of the ultimate harm more likely . . . Persons
who perform the proscribed act (e.g., lighting the match) should not be
punished unless they are culpable for the ultimate harm (e.g., the ﬁre) to be
prevented.27
Still others take this line of thought even further. Larry Alexander and
Kimberley Ferzan, for instance, argue that all of what they call ‘‘inchoate
offenses’’ are unjustiﬁable.28 By ‘‘inchoate offenses,’’ they mean offenses
22. Id. at 553, emphasis added.
23. As we will see, this concession turns out to be signiﬁcant. See generally section II
below.
24. Ashworth & Zedner, Just Prevention, supra note 1, at 292.
25. Douglas N. Husak, Guns and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the
Criminal Sanction, 23 LAW & PHIL. 437 (2004).
26. HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 1, at 174.
27. Id. at 175.
28. LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLEY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY,
ch. 6 (2009); Larry Alexander & Kimberley Kessler Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes:
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targeting conduct that does not yet impose any risk of harm. Again, Alex-
ander and Ferzan do not deny that it may be legitimate to take some
preventive action against those who have yet to ‘‘unleash’’ any risks. Their
objection is rather that such actors have yet to perform any culpable action,
and hence, to do anything that renders them deserving of criminal pun-
ishment. As Ferzan puts it, inchoate offenses have ‘‘nothing to do with
retributive desert and everything to do with prevention.’’29 Regardless of
the validity of the preventive goals of these offenses, legislators thus ought
not to pursue them through the criminal law.
I I . RECONSTRUCT ING THE SKEPT ICAL ARGUMENT
Each of these authors ultimately suggests different substantive constraints
on the creation of preventive offenses.30 This article’s focus, however, will
be on a more basic normative commitment that they share. All are con-
cerned that the pursuit of preventive goals has led to the creation of offenses
that lack adequate retributive credentials. Moreover, all agree on approx-
imately why this is so. Criminal wrongdoing—wrongdoing that warrants
censure and punishment through the criminal law—requires culpably risk-
ing, even if not ultimately causing, harm to others. We should therefore be
skeptical of at least some offenses that target conduct that is remote from
the harm that they aim to prevent.
Does this line of argument provide a sound case for skepticism about
preventive offenses? As may already be apparent, some clariﬁcation will be
needed to answer this question. To begin with, we should separate two
distinct kinds of retributive criticism that some of the remarks just quoted
tend to elide. First, objections to preventive offenses are sometimes made in
terms of the ‘‘grounds’’ for such offenses or the relative ‘‘strength’’ of their
Retribution or Prevention?, in SEEKING SECURITY 103 (Sullivan & Dennis eds.), supra note
1; Larry Alexander & Kimberley Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, 9
OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 637 (2012).
29. Kimberley Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty De-
privations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 164 (2011). See also
Kimberley Kessler Ferzan, Inchoate Crimes at the Prevention/Punishment Divide, 48 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1273 (2011).
30. Ashworth & Zedner, Prevention and Criminalization, supra note 1, at 547–62;
HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 1, at ch. 3.III. As just mentioned, Alexander
and Ferzan regard all inchoate offenses (in their sense) as illegitimate.
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‘‘justiﬁcation.’’ This language suggests a focus on the admissible reasons for
criminalization. As we have seen, the skeptics regard the censuring charac-
ter of the criminal law as normatively signiﬁcant. One valid reason to
criminalize conduct, one might think, is that it is wrongful and deserving
of censure.31 As the name suggests, however, the main reasons in favor of
preventive offenses are not retributive but preventive: we may not have
strong reason to censure the conduct that they target. Hence (the argument
goes), the case for the creation of preventive offenses is relatively weak when
compared to the case for the traditional core crimes of culpably harming
others.
As we will see in section IV below, these claims give us some food for
thought. Censure will not always be an important component of the
positive case for nonconsummate offenses. Hence, one might wonder
whether we should prefer a noncensuring response to the conduct that
they target: for instance, preventive restrictions of liberty or some form of
civil regulation. For the moment, however, we can leave this issue aside.
The important point is that this is not necessarily a strong reason to doubt
the legitimacy of preventive offenses. Facilitating the censure of wrongful
conduct provides just one valid reason to criminalize: there may yet be
others. In particular—and as the skeptics characteristically admit—preven-
tion might also play a justiﬁcatory role. Thus, even if nonconsummate
offenses carry an additional justiﬁcatory burden, preventive rationales
might yet relieve this.
This suggests that talk of preventive ‘‘rationales’’ or ‘‘justiﬁcations’’ for
criminalization actually tends to obscure the skeptics’ true concerns. The
normative weight of their view is rather carried by a second, distinct kind
of retributive argument. This relates to the kinds of conduct that criminal
offenses may target. Again, this argument proceeds from the observation
that the criminal law is distinctly censuring and punitive in character.
Since only culpable wrongdoers deserve to be censured and punished,
the state ought only to criminalize culpable wrongdoing. The problem
with nonconsummate offenses is that, due to the remoteness of the con-
duct that they target from the relevant ultimate harm, they may not always
target culpable wrongdoing of the requisite kind. In Ashworth and Zed-
ner’s terms: the conduct targeted may not actually ‘‘threaten or risk’’ the
31. For discussion, see, e.g., R.A. Duff, Towards a Modest Legal Moralism, 8 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 217 (2014).
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harm to be prevented. Hence (the argument goes), to criminalize such
conduct may not be a legitimate means of pursuing legislators’ preventive
goals.
It will be helpful to be clear about the logic behind the ﬁnal, key move of
this argument. The conclusion of the argument is that conduct may legit-
imately be criminalized only if it has an appropriate kind of relationship to
an ultimate harm, for example, that it ‘‘threatens or risks’’ that harm. This
conclusion is to be derived from two premises. First, conduct may legiti-
mately be criminalized only if it is wrongful. Second, conduct is wrongful
only if it is appropriately related to an ultimate harm.32
This argument, if sound, constitutes a decisive objection to at least some
preventive offenses. Since the conclusion of the argument follows from its
premises, the question for us is whether these premises are true. For the
sake of argument, this article will assume the truth of the ﬁrst premise: that
only wrongful conduct may be criminalized. This premise is the familiar
thesis of ‘‘negative’’ legal moralism, and it is widely believed to follow
simply from the criminal law’s censuring character.33 The focus of this
section, therefore, will rather be on the second premise: that conduct is
wrongful, in the sense required for criminalization, only if it is appropri-
ately related to an ultimate harm. Our task will be to ﬁnd a speciﬁc inter-
pretation of this ‘‘appropriate relationship’’ that casts the skeptical
argument in its strongest possible light. Ideally, of course, this means
providing an interpretation that is independently plausible. But our inter-
pretation should also be faithful to the skeptics’ aim: to cast doubt on the
legitimacy of existing preventive offenses. Can we interpret the skeptics’
second premise in a way that satisﬁes both of these desiderata?
As we have seen, the skeptics tend to identify preventive offenses with
nonconsummate offenses. One may therefore be led to think that the
nonconsummate nature of these offenses is what is putatively problematic.
Yet the skeptics do not suggest that we have reason to doubt the criminal-
ization of any and all types of nonharmful conduct. For, as is familiar, it is
by no means obvious why the criminal law should be interested in harming
32. This formulation is borrowed from Victor Tadros, Harm, Sovereignty and Prohibi-
tion, 17 LEGAL THEORY 35, 45 (2011). The formulation is deliberately vague; the purpose of
this section is to consider how best to endow it with more speciﬁc content.
33. On ‘‘positive’’ and ‘‘negative’’ legal moralism, see Duff, Towards a Modest Legal
Moralism, supra note 31; R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME, ch, 4 (2007).
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per se. It is easy to see why it should attend to culpability: surely the state
ought not to censure a person unless her actions reﬂect badly on her. But as
criminal lawyers well know, a person whose actions do not cause harm can
be just as culpable as one whose actions do cause harm. For instance, the
would-be assassin whose bullet is stopped by a passing bird is just as
culpable as the assassin who succeeds. Even if there are good reasons to
convict these actors of different offenses, and to punish them differently,
their actions reﬂect on them (qua actors) equally badly.34
This shows us that censure may be due without harm—or indeed,
without any kind of ‘‘objective’’ wrongdoing. It also shows us that criminal
liability may be due: again, the skeptics surely do not mean to cast doubt on
the offense of attempt.35 Once one acknowledges this, however, certain
other kinds of preventive offense no longer seem so difﬁcult to justify.
Consider, for instance, the category of preparatory offenses, mentioned
above. A particularly broad-ranging example of such an offense is the
U.K. offense of preparing acts of terrorism. One commits this offense if
one ‘‘engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to’’ an inten-
tion to commit or assist an act of terrorism.36 Although commission of this
offense does not entail causing any harm associated with terrorism, the
conduct that it catches is surely still culpable. All else being equal, it reﬂects
badly on people if they act on intentions to commit terrorist acts. The state
thus seems to have a pro tanto case for censuring such conduct.
The skeptics, however, will surely resist this conclusion. They might
accept that preparatory acts are culpable; they will deny, though, that they
display the speciﬁc kind of culpability that criminalization requires. They
might proceed by invoking something like Antony Duff’s view of attempts.
Duff advocates the conduct requirement for attempts employed in English
law: that the actor must have gone beyond mere preparations for executing
34. To be clear, this is not to say anything about the proper impact of outcomes on
criminal liability. The point is simply that culpability is not sensitive to outcomes. Whether
considerations beyond culpability should ultimately affect liability is a separate matter. For
discussion, see Judith Jarvis Thomson, Morality and Bad Luck, 20 METAPHILOSOPHY 203
(1989).
35. Indeed, skeptics often lament the disparity in the criminal law’s treatment of at-
tempted and completed crimes. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Taking the Consequences, in
ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 107 (Stephen Shute et al, eds., 1993); ALEXANDER
& FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY, supra note 28, ch. 5.
36. Terrorism Act 2006 § 5(1).
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her criminal intentions and embarked on ‘‘the crime proper.’’37 Such a test
has instrumental beneﬁts; for example, it maximizes freedom and incenti-
vizes desistance. For Duff, though, what is most important about this test is
that it respects actors’ autonomy.38 Crimes of preparation fail to do this;
they impose liability even when actors have not ﬁnally chosen to bring
about the relevant ultimate harm.39
One might support this argument with an analogy. The objection to
criminalizing preparatory acts is materially similar (one might argue) to the
objection to criminalizing things like thoughts and status. Like preparatory
acts, these things can be culpable: for instance, it can reﬂect badly on one
that one holds a given opinion. Surely, though, this would not lead anyone
to argue for the creation of thought crimes. Again, a principle prohibiting
the creation of thought crimes will have instrumental beneﬁts: it will help
to preserve liberty and privacy. But more importantly, such a principle
respects the status of human actors as responsible moral agents. As with
preparatory acts, thoughts do not yet instantiate a choice to intervene in the
objective world in a wrongful or harmful way.40
We should understand the skeptics, then, as endorsing a speciﬁc con-
ception of the required relationship between wrongful conduct and ulti-
mate harm. Conduct is wrongful, in the sense required for criminalization,
only if it instantiates a culpable choice to intervene in the world in a poten-
tially harmful way. However, this conception also requires reﬁnement. To
see why, consider again preparatory acts. As well as being culpable in their
pursuit of wrongful goals, preparatory actions often increase the risk that
those goals will be achieved. As actors carry out each stage of a criminal
37. R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 385–97 (1996). Identifying the point at which
‘‘mere preparation’’ becomes ‘‘the crime proper’’ is, of course, notoriously tricky. For an
innovative recent discussion, see GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS: IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, chs. 8 & 10 (2010).
38. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS, supra note 37, at 386–93.
39. Ashworth & Zedner, Just Prevention, supra note 1, at 285–86; Ashworth & Zedner,
Prevention and Criminalization, supra note 1, at 556–57. Alexander and Ferzan also regard
this concern as ‘‘decisive’’ against preparatory offenses: see Danger, supra note 28, at 655.
Note, though, that Duff himself would now accept criminal liability for ‘‘mere preparation’’
under some conditions: see his Risks, Culpability and Criminal Liability, in SEEKING
SECURITY 121 (Sullivan & Dennis eds.), supra note 1.
40. On this analogy, compare Douglas Husak, Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?,
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 47–51 (2010) and ALAN
BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM 114–17 (2009).
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plan, they re-afﬁrm their intentions, thereby increasing (often knowingly)
the probability that their plans will come to fruition.41 This is not yet, of
course, a case for a general offense of preparing crime: the great costs of
such an offense to liberty and privacy would probably tell against it in the
ﬁnal analysis. But we might still criminalize concretely deﬁned, particularly
risky preparatory acts. For example, using known patterns of offending as
a guide, we could identify the last possible point of effective intervention by
law enforcement agencies.42 Because of its dangerous nature, it is at least
arguable that offenses targeting such conduct would satisfy the requirement
of potentially harmful intervention in the world.
To understand what is at stake here, we must pause brieﬂy to clarify the
precise sense in which preparatory actions can be dangerous. The argument
just sketched holds that the risks attached to preparatory actions generally
grow as actors come closer to realizing their criminal plans. This argument
relies on the following conception of risk: there is a risk of a given harm
occurring to the extent that it is probable that the harm will occur. Doubt-
less it is generally true that, according to the evidence available to observers,
prospective offenders are more likely to succeed in realizing their criminal
plans the further those plans progress. What is more, these prospective
offenders are clearly responsible, in progressing with their plans, for the
conditions that render this true. In this sense, preparatory actors can be
responsible for increasing the probability that the relevant ultimate harm
will occur. Hence, they create a risk of that harm occurring.43
If this is correct, then how can the skeptics continue to insist that we
should doubt the legitimacy of preparatory offenses? Alexander and Ferzan
provide an answer to this question: that actors who have executed only
preparatory steps of their criminal plans have not yet, strictly speaking,
imposed or ‘‘unleashed’’ a risk. Certainly, from the perspective of observers,
the probability that an actor will cause harm increases as her plan
41. Daniel Ohana, Desert and Punishment for Acts Preparatory to the Commission of
a Crime, 20 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 113, 117–20 (2007).
42. Daniel Ohana, Responding to Acts Preparatory to the Commission of a Crime: Crim-
inalization or Prevention?, 25 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23, 27–31 (2006). Compare Shlomit
Wallerstein, Criminalizing Remote Harm and the Case of Anti-Democratic Activity, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 2697 (2007).
43. Some believe that this kind of relationship between act and potential consequence is
itself sufﬁcient to justify criminal prohibitions: see, e.g., Tadros, Harm, Sovereignty and
Prohibition, supra note 32, at 45–46.
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progresses. But (the argument goes) the criminal law should not be inter-
ested in observers’ perspectives. From the actor’s perspective, whether or
not her plan will ultimately result in harm remains entirely contingent
upon her future choices. Surely, then, we ought not to say that she has
imposed a risk, even if she has evidence that she is likely to act on her own
intentions in the future. Again, the actor has not yet engaged with the
objective world in any way. Certainly, we may say that such an actor is
‘‘dangerous,’’ or that she ‘‘poses a threat,’’ or some such. But we may not say
that she has imposed a risk of harm until her future choices are no longer
decisive as to whether or not that harm will occur.44
Similar things might then be said about other kinds of preventive
offense. For example, consider offenses prohibiting the possession of weap-
ons such as knives or ﬁrearms. Common sense suggests that people who
possess weapons are more likely to cause harm (or at least, to cause harm
using those weapons) than people who do not. However, mere possession
does not impose a risk of harm, since whether or not those weapons will be
used to cause harm remains (all else being equal) entirely contingent upon
the possessor’s future choices.45 Likewise, assuming that preventive orders
target harmful conduct, or conduct that imposes a risk of harm, those who
breach them can properly be seen as dangerous. But an actor does not
actually impose the relevant risks until he engages in further instances of
the conduct that the order targets.
Here, then, is a plausible way in which the skeptics might specify the
retributive deﬁciency of some preventive offenses. Conduct is not wrong-
ful, in the sense required for criminalization, unless it imposes a risk in the
manner just described. That is to say: conduct is wrongful only if it has
potential harmful consequences that are, from the actor’s perspective, no
longer entirely contingent upon his or her future choices. Again, let us
assume here that the skeptics’ ﬁrst premise is true: that is, that conduct may
be criminalized only if it is wrongful. We may thus derive the following
conclusion: conduct may be criminalized only if it has potential harmful
consequences that are, from the actor’s perspective, no longer entirely
44. See generally Alexander & Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes; CRIME AND CULPA-
BILITY, ch. 6, both supra note 28.
45. Some proceed on the basis that possession is itself a form of endangerment: see, e.g.,
Dennis J Baker, Collective Criminalization and the Constitutional Right to Endanger Others,
28 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 168 (2009). This proves unhelpful, however, for reasons that will be
discussed in section III below.
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contingent upon his or her future choices. Since things such as preparation
and possession do not necessarily impose risks in this sense, they ought not
to be criminal in themselves. At the very least, offenses targeting such
conduct must include additional mens rea requirements to ensure that they
meet this criterion.46 We have thus arrived at a plausible reconstruction of
the skeptics’ retributive argument.
Notice, however, the kind of further defense that this argument now
requires. It is not enough for the skeptics to emphasize the unique form of
the criminal law: in particular, its employment of censure and punishment.
Rather, they must defend the substantive moral proposition contained in
their second premise: that conduct is wrongful only if it imposes risks. As
we have seen, this proposition is not self-evidently true. Indeed, it seems to
exclude conduct that is culpable and worthy of censure from the category
of ‘‘wrongdoing’’ for the purposes of the criminal law. We might therefore
ask: is there any coherent sense of ‘‘wrongdoing’’ that includes risk impo-
sition but excludes mere preparation, of the kind that this proposition
imagines?
Answering this question lies beyond the scope of this article. Sufﬁce it to
say for now that there are at least some cases in which it seems unprob-
lematic to impose criminal liability for acts short of risk imposition. Imag-
ine, for instance, that security services have been tracking a person who has
been preparing an act of terrorism, say, a city center bombing. Imagine
further that this is the last chance for agents to intervene before it becomes
impossible to stop the prospective bomber. Can it really be true that, as
a matter of moral principle, the state may not censure or punish this actor?
That at most, the state may restrict his liberty for as long as is necessary to
avert the threat that he poses?47 At least as a pretheoretical conclusion, it is
difﬁcult to imagine that many people will be willing to embrace this.48 This
suggests that there are limits at least to the intuitive appeal of the concep-
tion of wrongdoing on which the skeptics rely.
46. See, e.g., HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 1, at 174–76.
47. Again, this is Alexander and Ferzan’s view: see generally Alexander & Ferzan, Danger,
supra note 28.
48. For an instructive example, consider the English Law Commission’s recommendations
on the scope of general liability for preparatory conduct. The Commission explicitly rejected
the argument that anticipatory powers of arrest are an adequate substitute for a criminal
conviction in cases like the one just imagined. See Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts
187 (Consultation Paper No 183, 2007).
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This is beside the point, however. The aim of this section has not been to
show that the skeptics’ arguments are unsound; rather, its aim has been to
elucidate these arguments. The skeptics’ strongest suit lies in the idea that
some preventive offenses do not target wrongdoing of a kind that may be
censured and punished through the criminal law. Speciﬁcally, these offenses
do not target conduct that risks harm to others. Thus understood, the key
premise in the skeptics’ argument is not a claim about the censuring and
punitive form of the criminal law. It is a substantive moral claim about the
kinds of conduct that the criminal law may censure and punish. If this claim
cannot be defended, then the present objection to preventive offenses fails.
I I I . PREVENT IVE REGULAT ION
This section now turns to explain why the argument just discussed is
unsound. It is unsound, it is argued, because it relies on a false premise:
contrary to the skeptics’ view, the proper scope of criminal wrongdoing
extends beyond risk-imposing conduct. To demonstrate this, it is not
necessary to defend an alternative paradigm of criminal wrongdoing.49 It
will sufﬁce to provide a clear counter-example to the paradigm on which
the skeptics rely. The counter-example that will be discussed is regulatory
or malum prohibitum wrongdoing. In this case, the wrongness of conduct
need not be contingent upon whether it imposes a risk of an ultimate harm.
Indeed, it need not be contingent upon any particular form of prelegal
culpability in relation to such a harm. It follows that these cannot be
decisive factors in determining the legitimacy of preventive offenses.
A. Regulatory Wrongs
The idea that criminal wrongdoing can consist in breaching a regulation is
not, of course, a novel one. Criminal jurisprudence has long recognized
a distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita offenses. Simply put,
this is the distinction between offenses targeting prelegal wrongdoing and
offenses targeting conduct that is wrong as a result of its legal prohibition.
For our purposes, it does not matter whether this distinction succeeds in
49. For some good reasons to be generally skeptical about appeals to paradigms in
criminalization theory, see Lindsay Farmer, Criminal Wrongs in Historical Perspective, in
THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 214 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010).
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drawing a bright line between types of offense. It probably does not; by
deﬁnition, criminal offenses are never simply prelegal wrongs. Rather, this
distinction is important because it highlights different sorts of wrongs that
may warrant the creation of an offense. Even if the conduct targeted by
a preventive offense is not prelegally wrongful, it may yet be wrongful as
a result of its regulation through the criminal law.50
To illustrate this distinction, consider some of the different forms of
preventive offense surveyed above. Although these create unfamiliar forms
of criminal liability, several of them target conduct whose (putative) wrong-
ness can readily be identiﬁed independently of the law. For instance, as we
saw in the previous section, some offenses explicitly target prelegal wrongs
of preparation: that is, of acting on an intention to commit some future
harmful act. Other offenses, meanwhile, explicitly target wrongs of indirect
contribution to others’ harmful conduct. Consider, for instance, the U.S.
federal code offense of providing material support to a terrorist, or the U.K.
offense of encouraging terrorism. Again, these offenses are deﬁned relative
to (potential) ultimate harms: they require defendants to have mens rea in
relation to their contribution to potential terrorist acts.51
Other preventive offenses target prelegal wrongs in less explicit ways.
One common pattern involves targeting a particular form of conduct, from
which a criminal purpose is then to be presumed. For instance, the Model
Penal Code’s ‘‘instruments of crime’’ offense creates a presumption of crim-
inal purpose where the instrument possessed is a weapon.52 A related device
is to create an offense targeting a particular form of conduct, to which
lack of a criminal purpose is then made a defense. Again, this device can
be found in the Model Penal Code, for example, in the offense of possessing
an offensive weapon. It is a defense under this section for the defendant to
show, inter alia, that ‘‘he possessed or dealt with the weapon . . . under
50. The seminal study of mala prohibita offenses is Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to
Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Of-
fenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997). Mala prohibita are historically associated with the so-
called regulatory or public welfare model of criminal offenses. As Green points out, how-
ever, the two categories are analytically distinct. Just as public welfare offenses might target
prelegally wrongful conduct, so might the ‘‘real’’ criminal law play a regulatory role.
51. In the case of the former offense, defendants must contribute intentionally or
knowingly to the relevant (potential) harmful act: 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). For the latter
offense, mere recklessness will sufﬁce: Terrorism Act 2006 § 1(2).
52. Model Penal Code § 5.06(2).
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circumstances . . . negativing any purpose or likelihood that the weapon
would be used unlawfully.’’53
A more complex example of this latter device is the U.K. offense called
‘‘possession for terrorist purposes.’’ What this offense in fact prohibits is
possession of an article ‘‘in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that [the] possession is for a purpose connected with . . . an act of
terrorism.’’54 It is then a defense for the defendant to show that his pos-
session was not actually for any terrorist purpose.55 Clearly there are poten-
tial objections to structuring offenses in this way. By targeting conduct that
merely creates a presumption or ‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ of an underlying
wrong, courts may be prevented from adjudicating on the underlying
wrong itself.56 Still, the relevant wrong underlying these offenses remains
essentially a prelegal one. As with more explicitly preparatory offenses, what
is signiﬁcant is the speciﬁcation of an ultimate harmful intent.
Some other preventive offenses, by contrast, cannot plausibly be char-
acterized as targeting prelegal wrongs. The most notable examples are what
one might call ‘‘mere’’ possession offenses: offenses that target possession of
particular articles, regardless of whether the possessor intends to use those
articles for harmful purposes. Such offenses are often used to target the
threat of harm from weapons. In U.K. law, for instance, possession of
uncertiﬁed ﬁrearms is criminal regardless of intention,57 with some kinds
of ﬁrearm being prohibited absolutely amongst civilians.58 Even jurisdic-
tions that do not criminalize ‘‘mere’’ ﬁrearm possession will often prohibit
the mere possession of weapons of at least some kinds. For instance, it is
a federal crime in the United States to possess chemical weapons,59 or
weapons ‘‘designed or intended to release radiation or radioactivity at a level
dangerous to human life.’’60
53. Model Penal Code § 5.07.
54. Terrorism Act 2000 § 57(1).
55. Terrorism Act 2000 § 57(2).
56. For a critique of offenses structured in this way, see James Edwards, Justice Denied:
The Criminal Law and the Ouster of the Courts, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (2010).
57. Firearms Act 1968 § 1. A slightly more permissive parallel regime governs the pos-
session of shotguns, which does not require a certiﬁcate for each such weapon: Firearms Act
1968 § 2.
58. Firearms Act 1968 §§ 5(1), 5(1A).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 229(a).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2332H(a).
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Offenses of mere possession are sometimes also used to target other
articles that are less ostensibly dangerous than weapons. For a particularly
dramatic example, consider the offense of collecting or possessing infor-
mation of a kind likely to be useful to a terrorist, under section 58 of the
United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act 2000.61 On the interpretation of U.K.
courts, liability for this offense is in no way contingent upon any connec-
tion to a potential future terrorist act. Rather, it depends solely on the
character of the information possessed.62 The defenses that are available to
a charge under section 58 reﬂect this. Defendants may offer a ‘‘reasonable
excuse’’ for their possession.63 But unlike some of the offenses previously
examined, this is not implicitly an offense of preparation: the legislation
targets the information itself, rather than potential uses of it. Therefore,
lack of a terrorist purpose, in and of itself, does not provide a reasonable
excuse for possessing information of the relevant kind.64
Perhaps tellingly, the skeptics face an analytical problem in dealing
with offenses like these: that they are not deﬁned in relation to any
ultimate harm.65 Since they do not specify the ultimate harm that they
aim to prevent, how can one determine whether these offenses target
conduct that wrongfully imposes a risk of that harm? Let us assume,
however, that we can overcome this difﬁculty, at least in some particular
cases. For instance, perhaps it is obvious enough that acts of terrorism are
the ultimate harms that section 58 aims to prevent. Skeptics might think
that the failure to specify this ultimate harm in the offense deﬁnition
actually tends to highlight what is objectionable about such offenses.66
Since merely possessing certain kinds of information does not obviously
risk causing any ultimate harm, surely we should doubt that such conduct
is wrongful.
61. Terrorism Act 2000 § 58.
62. R v. G [2009] UKHL 13; [2010] 1 AC 43.
63. Terrorism Act 2000 § 58(3).
64. [2009] UKHL 13, {{ [71]–[85]. On this point, the House of Lords overruled an
earlier decision of the English Court of Appeal: R v. K [2008] EWCA Crim 185; [2008] QB
827.
65. For further reﬂection on the difﬁculties that criminal law theorists face in categor-
izing possession offenses, see Markus Dirk Dubber, The Possession Paradigm: The Special
Part and the Police Power Model of the Criminal Process, inDEFINING CRIMES 91 (R.A. Duff
& Stuart P. Green eds., 2005).
66. See, e.g., HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 1, at 164–68.
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This thought, however, assumes the truth of the very proposition that
the skeptics need to support. It assumes, that is, that the criminal law may
only aim to prevent harm by targeting prelegal wrongs of risking that harm.
But sincemala prohibita offenses exist, we should question this assumption.
It need not be decisive against preventive offenses that they do not target
(a particular kind of) prelegal wrongdoing. Certainly, the ultimate aim of
section 58 may be to prevent terrorist harms. But it does not follow that it
must be conceptualized as a (putative) offense of risking such harms—or
indeed, as one of preparing or otherwise contributing to such harms.
Rather, the offense might aim to prevent terrorist harms simply by regu-
lating information of the relevant kind.
The regulatory model also provides the most promising rationale for
offenses of weapon possession. As several commentators have pointed out,
such offenses are over-inclusive qua offenses of risk imposition.67 But we
need not rationalize them in this way. We could instead see them as
regulatory provisions that aim to prevent weapon-related harm. By regu-
lating weapons, the state can change the incentives that people have for
possessing them. It can thereby reduce the risks of harm from such weap-
ons by ensuring that (for instance) there are fewer of them in circulation in
the ﬁrst place. Again, it need not matter on this view that individual tokens
of possession do not impose risks of the relevant harm. What is salient is
rather the scope of the state’s regulatory authority in relation to weapons,
and the obligations that its enactments create.
B. Regulatory Authority
Skeptics will press this last point about the scope of the state’s regulatory
authority. While preventive mala prohibita are a theoretical possibility (the
argument will go), this is not yet a case for the existence of any such offense.
Making such a case involves showing at least two additional things. First,
one must show that the state has the authority to regulate the relevant
conduct. Second, one must show that its regulation would succeed in
imposing obligations on citizens. If these conditions are not satisﬁed, then
the resulting offense would not be a genuine malum prohibitum: it would
67. See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, The Unfairness of Risk-Based Possession Offences, 5 CRIM.
L. & PHIL. 237 (2011); Dubber, The Possession Paradigm, supra note 65; Husak, Guns and
Drugs, supra note 25.
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not actually be wrong to commit it. Censure and punishment for the
offense would therefore be unwarranted.
Opinions on the scope of the state’s regulatory authority will depend on
the particular political theory or ideology to which one subscribes. Given
the scale of disagreement about such matters, this article does not attempt
to settle them.68 Rather, a more modest claim will be defended: it is likely
that the state at least sometimes has the power to alter citizens’ obligations
by regulating their conduct for preventive ends. Admittedly, some criminal
law theorists might regard even this claim as overly ambitious. Although
some putative mala prohibita can be explained relatively easily, it has
proved difﬁcult to ﬁnd any explanation that generalizes to a substantial
proportion of that class.69 Nevertheless, it is suggested that skepticism at
least about preventive mala prohibita is difﬁcult to reconcile with widely
held beliefs about the scope of state authority. Anarchists and possibly
libertarians aside, it is likely that most people should accept the authority
of the state to enact at least some preventive regulations.
To demonstrate this, consider an analogy with taxation. Regulation and
taxation are materially similar in at least the following respects. First, both
coerce citizens into surrendering their interests. Second, they do so by
threatening censure and punishment. Third, on at least some occasions,
the aim of such coercion is preventive. Fourth, citizens’ liabilities in either
case are not contingent upon responsibility for the threats that the measure
is designed to avert. Note that these features are mostly uncontroversial in
the taxation context. One might well object that taxes are too high in
practice; few, though, will object in principle to such preventive coercion.
Indeed, perhaps even libertarians will endorse some such measures. We can
expect widespread agreement on the use of taxation to fund, for instance,
national security and emergency relief.70
The difference between taxation and regulation lies in the kind of
interest that citizens are required to surrender. Whereas taxation schemes
68. Links between criminalization and issues of political authority and obligation are,
regrettably, seldom drawn. For exceptions, see, e.g., Stephen P Garvey,Was Ellen Wronged?,
7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 185 (2013); Green, Why It’s a Crime, supra note 50.
69. HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION, supra note 1, at 103–19.
70. Even the night-watchman state—limited to protecting its citizens against force,
fraud, and theft—would presumably need to be funded through contributions that are
(in some sense, at least) nonvoluntary. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND
UTOPIA, part 1 (1974).
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require us to surrender property, regulatory schemes require us to surrender
liberty. By obliging citizens to refrain from engaging in a given kind of
conduct (for example, possessing ﬁrearms), the state can advance legitimate
preventive projects (decreasing the number of ﬁrearm-related deaths and
injuries). Of course, as in the context of taxation, one might well object
that the range of liberties restricted by a given regulation is unfairly broad.
But it need not be fatal to such schemes that they prohibit conduct that
does not by itself threaten wrongful harm to others. Sometimes, we permit
the state to interfere with our interests as a means of preventing harm, even
in the absence of such threats.
Similarly, it need not be fatal to regulatory schemes that they secure
compliance by threatening and imposing criminal sanctions. Like preven-
tive regulations, taxation schemes may give rise to criminal liability: one
may be subject to censure and punishment if one fails to pay one’s taxes.71
Again, one might regard individual penalties for contraventions of such
schemes as unfairly harsh or disproportionate. The state must certainly be
prepared to justify such penalties, quite apart from the duties that the
relevant schemes impose. The important point for now, though, is that
we may say such things about both kinds of scheme. The simple fact that
preventive regulation threatens censure and punishment does not, by itself,
make it any more difﬁcult to justify than taxation.
Why should we accept the authority of the state to interfere with our
interests in order to prevent harms and risks for which we are not respon-
sible? Although this question again raises complex issues, an approximate
answer is not far to seek.72 One of the main reasons in favor of the state’s
existence is its capacity to advance important public goods like security.73
The state advances these goods partly through centralized collection and
allocation of resources, that is, by taxing citizens to support public spending
on security-advancing projects. But it can also advance security by using its
71. In U.K. law, see, e.g., Taxes Management Act 1970 § 106A. Note, however, that this
offense requires the tax evasion concerned to be ‘‘knowing’’ and ‘‘fraudulent.’’ Perhaps it is
a valid objection to some of the other offenses considered here that they are not constrained
in comparable ways.
72. The issues are complex partly because one might well challenge the premises of the
question. Our ‘‘interests’’ in liberty and property cannot necessarily be determined pre-
legally. Compare G.A. Cohen, The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom, 12 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 3 (1983); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, ch. 13 (1991).
73. See generally IAN LOADER & NEIL WALKER, CIVILIZING SECURITY (2007).
22 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 18 | NO . 1 | W INTER 2015
This content downloaded from 129.215.244.27 on Tue, 31 Mar 2015 05:18:56 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
authority to regulate behavior. By regulating behavior, the state can change
the incentives that citizens have in ways that would not otherwise be
possible. Although this enterprise has general liberty costs, these may be
justiﬁable in light of the security beneﬁts that each citizen can expect to
receive as a result.
Moreover, we usually assume that we have at least some prelegal duties to
promote one another’s security. Many believe, for instance, that we have at
least moral duties of easy rescue.74 The legal enforcement of such duties
may be controversial: one might think that this would impose unacceptably
heavy burdens on the unlucky few who ﬁnd themselves in positions to
rescue. General preventive measures, however, improve on duties to rescue
in precisely this respect. By enacting such measures, the state can allow
citizens to promote one another’s security at minimal cost to themselves.
Effectively, citizens contribute a small amount to a collective, coordinated
effort to achieve a preventive goal.75 Thus, citizens may be obliged give up
$1 each if this would provide enough resources to (say) rehouse the victims
of a natural disaster. It is surely plausible that they may also be obliged to
surrender a small amount of liberty for a comparable preventive end.
C. Justifying Particular Regulations
All of this might sound ﬁne in theory. But one might worry about the
practical consequences of embracing regulatory rationales for criminaliza-
tion. Whatever its theoretical merits, the skeptics’ view at least has clear
strategic advantages. By appealing to a relatively narrow paradigm of crim-
inal wrongdoing, it places a strong constraint on the content of the criminal
law. In contrast, regulatory rationales seem to license a potentially limitless
range of offenses. Highly over-inclusive provisions, such as the U.K.’s
section 58, become potentially justiﬁable on this model. This result will
perhaps seem sufﬁciently counter-intuitive to cast doubt on the arguments
advanced thus far.
74. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS, ch. 4 (1984). For a more radical
perspective, see Peter Singer, Famine, Afﬂuence and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229
(1972).
75. This, indeed, is a strong reason to endorse such collective measures. They promote
security without forcing individuals to bear large burdens on a regular basis. Ironically, this
makes the imposition of individual duties to rescue in exceptional cases easier to justify as
well: see FEINBERG, id. at 169–71.
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Such doubts, however, are premature. Just because the state generally
has the authority to enact preventive regulations, it does not follow that all
such regulations are justiﬁable. Indeed, one may object to offenses like
section 58 precisely on the grounds that they are not justiﬁable even qua
regulatory provisions. To see why, consider what kinds of information
might qualify as ‘‘useful’’ to (prospective) terrorists. Prima facie, this pro-
vision catches a great deal of information with many everyday uses: for
instance, the information contained in train timetables and maps. Clearly,
citizens would be very surprised to ﬁnd that they require a reasonable
excuse for possessing such articles. Courts have thus been forced to narrow
the actus reus of this offense. However, even the interpretation of the
statutory language that they have produced remains very broad. For exam-
ple, crudely hand-drawn plans of government-owned buildings have been
held to fall within the scope of this provision.76
The root of the courts’ problem here has been that material that is useful
for terrorist purposes—however that condition is ultimately deﬁned—is
also likely to be useful for many innocent or beneﬁcial purposes.77 Thus,
this offense is inherently likely to have a much greater impact on citizens’
liberties than an offense of possession for terrorist purposes. By contrast, its
marginal security beneﬁts over such an offense are small. Given the range of
information caught by the offense and its ready availability, one may
assume that suspicion of terrorist purposes will in practice remain a crucial
criterion in enforcement. Hence, it is difﬁcult to imagine that section 58
enables much preventive action that preparatory offenses would not also
enable. Its considerable costs to citizens’ liberties are thus likely to be
decisive against it.
One can compare this to the balance struck by offenses of weapon
possession. Again, one might worry that such offenses are over-inclusive.
Can the regulation of mere weapon possession be justiﬁed, even in cases
where there is no reason to believe that possessors have any criminal
purpose?78 To answer this question, note ﬁrst of all that the marginal
liberty costs of weapon offenses tend to be much lower than those of
76. R v. G [2009] UKHL 13; [2010] 1 AC 43. For further reﬂection on the actus reus of
this offense, see Jacqueline Hodgson & Victor Tadros, How to Make a Terrorist Out of
Nothing, 72 MOD. L. REV. 984, 987–90 (2009).
77. Hodgson & Tadros, id. at 987.
78. See, e.g., Husak, Guns and Drugs, supra note 25.
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section 58. Whereas the latter offense potentially includes widely used
articles, the prohibition of many kinds of weapons will have no or minimal
costs for most citizens. For instance, it is telling that offenses of ‘‘merely’’
possessing chemical or nuclear weapons are rarely a target for the skeptics.
It is difﬁcult to see how citizens lose anything whatsoever of value as a result
of prohibitions like these.
Matters are more complex in relation to other types of weapon. Firearms
offenses are a particularly contentious example. It is true that some citizens
might have innocent or beneﬁcial uses for ﬁrearms. Some people might use
guns for professional purposes, for instance, or enjoy (harmless) shooting as
a leisure activity. However, this is not necessarily a fatal objection to the
regulation of (mere) ﬁrearm possession. Such regulation need not impose
absolute prohibitions; citizens may be given a conditional permission to
possess ﬁrearms of some kinds. This is the model adopted in U.K. law,
where only the most dangerous kinds of ﬁrearms are absolutely prohib-
ited.79 Citizens may possess ﬁrearms of other kinds, on the condition that
they obtain a certiﬁcate from their local police force.80 Although this
condition does restrict citizens’ freedom to own ﬁrearms for innocent
purposes, this is only a comparatively modest liberty cost. This may be
justiﬁable if it yields sufﬁcient preventive beneﬁts, for example, by allowing
the state to be relatively sure that those who possess ﬁrearms do so for
innocent purposes.
Are such marginal security beneﬁts sufﬁcient, all things considered, to
justify the relatively modest incursions on citizens’ liberties that ﬁrearms
offenses impose? Clearly, much will depend here on empirical evidence
about the effectiveness of such regulation. But given the right background
conditions, one can at least imagine a positive answer to this question. At
least in societies like the United Kingdom, where levels of gun ownership
and gun-related crime are relatively low, the rationale for such offenses
need not rest solely on their potential to catch dangerous people. Rather,
their preventive potential consists partly in the fact that they might help to
79. Or at least, so we may assume. Whether the legislation correctly identiﬁes the most
dangerous kinds of ﬁrearms is a question beyond the scope of this article.
80. Applicants must show that they have good reason for possessing the ﬁrearm in
question; that they are ﬁt to be trusted with it; and that possession will not pose any danger
to public safety or the public peace. Certiﬁcates may also stipulate conditions for possession:
Firearms Act 1968 § 27.
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maintain the low-ownership status quo.81 In this respect, ﬁrearms offenses
are unlike section 58. The marginal preventive beneﬁts of this latter
offense—if indeed there are any—will not derive from control of the
information that it targets. At most, the offense makes it easier for the state
to restrict the liberty of those whom it already suspects of having terrorist
intentions.
Other kinds of weapon will again raise different issues. Take the exam-
ple of knives. The liberty costs of prohibiting knife possession will be
considerably higher than those of prohibiting ﬁrearm possession. Unlike
guns, we can imagine that most people will have legitimate uses for knives
at some point in the course of at least their domestic lives. Again, though,
this is not necessarily fatal to offenses of mere knife possession. Legal
strategies are available that can help to minimize the liberty costs of such
offenses. For instance, consider the provisions of the Model Penal Code as
they apply to knives. As we saw, the Code makes it an offense to possess an
offensive weapon; however, an article is not an ‘‘offensive weapon’’ to the
extent that it serves a ‘‘common lawful purpose.’’82 Similarly, to the extent
that knives qualify as ‘‘weapons,’’ their possession is potentially caught
under the offense of possessing instruments of crime. But this is only so
where the possessor has the weapon ‘‘on or about his person, in a vehicle
occupied by him, or otherwise readily available for use.’’83 Possession under
certain conditions, including in the possessor’s home, is explicitly excluded
from the offense.84
Taken together, the effect of these provisions is similar to the effect of
the U.K. regime governing knives. Under this regime, the possession of
knives in private is not criminalized; only the liberty to carry a knife in
81. It is important to emphasize the signiﬁcance of such contextual factors to the jus-
tiﬁability of preventive regulations. At least some of Husak’s skepticism about ﬁrearms
offenses, for instance, derives from the fact that the U.S. has high rates of gun ownership
and gun-related violence. Against this background, generalized prohibitions of gun owner-
ship would likely be counterproductive: Husak, Guns and Drugs, supra note 25, at 450–60.
For a study of the situation in the U.K., which is largely supportive of legal controls as one
element of a more comprehensive and contextualized strategy to prevent gun crime, see
GAVIN HALES, CHRIS LEWIS, & DANIEL SILVERSTONE, GUN CRIME: THE MARKET IN
AND USE OF ILLEGAL FIREARMS (2006), especially ch. 6.
82. Model Penal Code § 5.07. Note that ‘‘daggers’’ are explicitly listed as offensive
weapons for the purposes of this provision, although knives simpliciter are not.
83. Model Penal Code § 5.06(2).
84. Model Penal Code § 5.06(2)(a).
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public is restricted.85 Again, however, even this restriction is not absolute:
possession for certain reasons (such as work-related reasons) is explicitly
excluded.86 Even those who don’t fall within the explicit exclusions have
the chance to offer a reasonable excuse for their possession.87 Thus, the
effect of this offense is merely to demand that citizens refrain from carrying
knives in public when they have no good reason to do so. To the extent
that the existence of offenses like these actually prevents knife crime, this
seems a fair enough price for citizens to pay.
I V . REGULAT ION AND CR IM INAL IZAT ION
Preventive offenses aim to prevent ultimate harms by targeting conduct
that does not directly cause or risk causing such harms. Skeptics argue that
we have inherent reason to doubt the legitimacy of such offenses. Their
argument, however, ignores the possibility that preventive offenses might
play a regulatory role. Even if such offenses do not target prelegal wrongs of
‘‘unleashing risk,’’ they may yet be a legitimate means of preventing ulti-
mate harms. Indeed, we have good reason to suppose that the state’s
regulatory authority extends to the creation of at least some such offenses.
Particularly in relation to things like weapon possession, regulation has the
potential to achieve relatively large preventive beneﬁts at a relatively small
cost to citizens’ liberties.
The skeptics might object, however, that the discussion thus far has
been somewhat disingenuous. Perhaps it is true that there are some legit-
imate preventive mala prohibita. But even if so (the argument will go), such
offenses lie some way beyond the criminal law’s normative core. As we have
already conceded, the state lacks strong reasons to censure those who
commit these offenses compared to the kind that it has to censure (say)
murderers or rapists. This thought might lead us to question whether the
criminal law is really the most appropriate means by which to pursue our
preventive goals in these cases. Does making the case for regulation entail
making the case for criminalization? Or should we prefer alternative forms
of preventive action?
85. Criminal Justice Act 1988 § 139.
86. Criminal Justice Act 1988 § 139(5).
87. Criminal Justice Act 1988 § 139(4).
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A. Types of Preventive Action
In answering these questions, it will be useful to understand why legislators
may sometimes prefer the criminal law to other forms of preventive action.
One way to illustrate this is via the following thought experiment. Imagine
that there is a type of harm that the state is concerned to prevent. Imagine
further that you are charged with designing a legal scheme to reduce the
incidence of that harm. For some reason, however, you may not take into
account in the design of your scheme the prelegal wrongness of any conduct
that might cause, risk, or otherwise contribute to that harm.88 How, then,
might you arrive at the decision that such conduct should be criminalized?
A likely starting point will be the familiar legislative conﬂict between
security interests and liberty interests.89 People generally have security inter-
ests: they have interests in being free from threats of harm. But they also
generally have liberty interests: they have interests in being able to perform
actions that might threaten harm, and in avoiding any legal liability that
might attach to these. When does advancing the former class of interests
justify setting back the latter? As is well known, this is a profound and
difﬁcult question. Although we should avoid the misleading impression
that liberty and security exist in a ‘‘zero-sum’’ relationship, it is often true
that advancing security interests entails setting back liberty interests.90
Some policies may immediately be ruled out as striking an unacceptable
balance. For instance, consider preventive restrictions of liberty, such as
preventive detention, house arrest, or curfews. A law providing for such
responses to those who are judged to pose a threat of the relevant harm
would doubtless enhance citizens’ security from that harm. However,
88. The thought experiment is worthwhile partly because many political theorists would
require the state to be blind to such considerations. Liberal neutrality may prevent appeals
to substantive moral ideas in the justiﬁcation of criminal justice policy. For discussion, see
Matt Matravers, Political Neutrality and Punishment, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 217 (2013).
89. This familiar terminology is not ideal, as it misleadingly suggests that security in-
terests and liberty interests should be identiﬁed with our interests in security and liberty. In
fact, an important set of one’s liberty interests are interests in security from state coercion.
So long as this is borne in mind, however, these terms remain analytically useful.
90. For a general case for caution about ‘‘balancing’’ metaphors in discussions of liberty
and security, see JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR AND TRADE-OFFS: PHILOSOPHY
FOR THE WHITE HOUSE, ch. 2 (2010). In the criminal justice context, see Andrew Ashworth,
Security, Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights, in SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 203
(Benjamin J. Goold & Liora Lazarus eds., 2007).
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modern states have not traditionally regarded the nonpunitive detention of
responsible agents as justiﬁable.91 Such detention unacceptably sets back
citizens’ liberty interests in at least two ways. First, under such a scheme,
citizens lack adequate opportunities to make choices that will allow them to
avoid liability.92 Second, detention itself drastically reduces the range of
options available to those subjected to it.
Detention is, of course, an extreme example. But any preventive restric-
tion based on judgments of dangerousness will tend to have liberty costs of
these sorts. An advantage of legal regulation, including criminalization, is
that it allows the state to pursue its preventive goals without sacriﬁcing
citizens’ liberty interests in these ways.93 Of course, legal regulation by
deﬁnition restricts some liberties. But it generally improves on restrictions
based on dangerousness in the two respects just highlighted. First, regula-
tion affords citizens the chance to avoid liability by choosing not to engage
in the prohibited conduct. Second, even the most over-inclusive regula-
tions will tend to leave open a greater range of options for citizens than
restrictions like detention.94
Depending on the burdens that they impose, different types of regula-
tion can also be more or less readily justiﬁable. Consider ﬁrst the civil law.
Civil law distributes citizens’ liabilities by establishing a network of legally
enforceable rights and duties.95 Its impact on liberty interests is generally
relatively modest, since its primary sanction is simply to ensure that those
who breach their duties pay a fair price for doing so to those whose rights
have been infringed. This is often achieved through private law relation-
ships, in which those who breach their duties are liable to compensate
directly those who are harmed by such breaches. But we can also imagine
91. Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 113 (1996); Neither Desert nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265 (1999). As Morse notes,
however, this supposedly general rule is often honored in its breach.
92. On the value of choice in relation to liability, see, e.g., H.L.A. HART, Legal
Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28 (1968); T.M. SCAN-
LON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER, chs. 6.2–6.3 (1998).
93. For discussion of reasons to choose such restrictions over legal regulation, see, e.g.,
Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment and Inchoate Crimes at the Prevention/Punishment
Divide, both supra note 29. The point here is not that the latter is always preferable to the
former. It is simply to show why this will sometimes be so.
94. Arthur Ripstein, Prohibition and Pre-Emption, 5 LEGAL THEORY 235, 260–63 (1999).
95. Compare Ripstein, id. at 239–41; see also generally his EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE LAW, chs. 1–4 (1999).
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other schemes of civil regulation, employing different compensatory me-
chanisms. For instance, the state could attach ﬁnes to any breach of duty,
regardless of harm caused, and then use the resulting funds to compensate
victims. While possibly being less efﬁcient than private law, this kind of
scheme would help to spread the compensatory burden more widely.96
In either case, compensatory sanctions are the main way in which these
schemes would aim to secure compliance. Thus, to the extent that the
rights and duties established by these schemes are truly fair, they would
impose (ex hypothesi) relatively modest burdens on citizens’ liberty interests.
Nevertheless, this feature of civil law might sometimes lead to allegations
that it does not do enough to protect security interests. If all the law
demands of actors is that they pay a fair price for breaching their duties,
then there will be some cases in which they have incentives to do this. For
a familiar illustration of this point, consider property rights. We can surely
expect civil law schemes to prevent some cases of theft or property damage.
But if such violations attract only civil sanctions, then actors may some-
times rationally prefer to compensate their victims than to avoid stealing or
vandalizing in the ﬁrst place.
One way to achieve stronger protection for security interests is through
criminal punishment. Although civil courts sometimes award punitive
damages that make defendants pay ‘‘over the odds’’ for their wrongdoing,
this is exceptional: to prevent through punishment rather than mere com-
pensation, we must normally turn to the criminal law.97 As we have seen,
though, the general availability of punishment is not the criminal law’s only
distinguishing feature. It also has an expressive, censuring capacity that civil
law lacks. Indeed, the fact that a single institution performs both these
punitive and censuring functions has led some to the view that punishment
itself is inherently expressive.98
96. To be clear, the discussion at this point is not about noncriminal or ‘‘quasicriminal’’
forms of regulation backed by sanctions going beyond compensation. On such schemes, see
section IV.B below. On the choice between criminalization and regulation backed by cost-
spreading, compensatory sanctions, see Victor Tadros, Criminalization and Regulation, in
THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 163 (R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010).
97. On the relationship between the compensation/punishment distinction and the
civil/criminal distinction, see Andrew Ashworth, Punishment and Compensation: Victims,
Offenders and the State, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 86 (1986).
98. See, most famously, JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in
DOING AND DESERVING 95 (1970).
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For the sake of both conceptual and normative clarity, however, we
should differentiate these two functions. It may be true that the word
‘‘punishment’’ typically denotes expressive sanctions. But even if so, it is
possible to separate conceptually the censuring aspects of these sanctions
from their ‘‘hard treatment’’ aspects. To emphasize this, let us refer to the
imposition of sanctions going beyond mere compensation as ‘‘penaliza-
tion.’’ In theory at least, censure and penalization are independent: the
state could penalize conduct without also censuring it, and vice versa.99 We
can therefore separate aptness for penalization from aptness for censure
(and thus, from aptness for punishment qua form of censure).
These points are unfortunately obscured by the fact that a single insti-
tution currently performs both of these unique functions.100 One might
speculate, indeed, that the skeptics’ view suffers from precisely this con-
ﬂation of censure and penalization. Perhaps culpable risk imposition is
the paradigm of a prelegal, censure-worthy wrong. But as we can now see,
criminal offenses need not target either prelegal wrongs or wrongs that are
especially worthy of censure. The state may have reason to create a regu-
lation that prohibits a given type of conduct, on the basis that this
conduct is particularly apt for penalization. Once again, these reasons
will not necessarily track the relationship of such conduct to any ultimate
harm or risk.
This again helps to shed light on offenses of weapon possession. As we
saw, the case for these offenses need not be made on the basis that posses-
sion of weapons is itself risky. It may be enough that the preventive goals of
these offenses justify the use of the state’s regulatory authority. Similarly,
the case for regulating weapon possession through the criminal law need not
be made on the basis that our response to such conduct should involve
censure. Our reasons for penalization may instead be salient. Overall,
incentivizing people against weapon possession—at least under certain
conditions—may strike a fairer balance between liberty and security than
other preventive options.
99. Civil injunctions arguably embody this distinction by threatening noncriminal
‘‘punishment’’ for contempt of court: see Ripstein, Prohibition and Pre-Emption, supra note
94, at 250–52.
100. Compare Tadros, who argues that, since the conditions for the legitimate appli-
cation of penalties and censure are materially similar, it makes sense that a single institution
performs both of these functions: Criminalization and Regulation, supra note 96, at 184.
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B. Penalization and Criminalization
Admittedly, however, distinguishing between censure and penalization
might also be seen to tell against the creation of preventive offenses. Cer-
tainly, under our current institutional arrangements, reasons to penalize are
reasons to criminalize. But perhaps this is best understood as the beginning
of an argument against these institutional arrangements. Ideally, one might
think, we would have an institutional distinction between censure and
penalization that tracked the conceptual distinction. For example, perhaps
the noncriminal, ‘‘administrative’’ model of regulation found in some jur-
isdictions could be adopted universally. This model allows for penalization
without the accompanying censure of criminal conviction. It would there-
fore be well suited to deal with breaches of preventive regulations, where
reasons for censure and reasons for penalization are likely to come apart.101
In considering this line of argument, note ﬁrst of all that it is not decisive
against ‘‘truly’’ criminal offenses of the regulatory kind. It was suggested
above that the state plausibly has some regulatory authority, such that
preventive regulations can impose genuine obligations on citizens. If this
is correct, then it follows that breaches of such regulations may warrant at
least some measure of censure. Granted, they may not warrant the level of
censure that attaches to the most serious ‘‘core’’ crimes. But this is equally
true of less serious tokens of the core crimes themselves. For instance, few
would argue that theft of small amounts of property should be decrimina-
lized simply because it is less worthy of censure than (say) the typical armed
robbery.
Still, perhaps the argument for treating regulatory breaches as noncrim-
inal at least rests on a sound generalization. Perhaps, that is, regulatory
breaches tend not to warrant the kind of censuring response that acts of
direct harming and risking do. If this is correct, then it may generate
compelling reasons for an institutional separation between regulation and
101. It should be noted that this model of regulation is often characterized by other
features besides its eschewal of criminal conviction and stigmatic punishments. For
example, it may also be characterized by weaker procedural protections and an increased
willingness to accept strict liability offenses. This section imagines a scheme that is non-
criminal only in the sense that it does not impose criminal sanctions. One may doubt
whether we should advocate the creation of a separate ‘‘administrative’’ scheme if it were to
have these other features. For discussion, see, e.g., R.A. DUFF ET AL., THE TRIAL ON
TRIAL. Vol. 3, TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 189–98 (2007).
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criminalization. For instance, perhaps routinely using the criminal law for
regulatory ends tends to weaken its moral credibility.102 Conversely, per-
haps this use of the criminal law will tend to lead to the conﬂation of
regulatory crime with ‘‘real’’ crime. If regulatory breaches are criminal, that
is, perhaps people will tend to treat them as worthy of a strong censuring
response even when they are not. Either way, there would be a compelling
case for developing institutions that allow the state to penalize conduct for
preventive ends, without also censuring it.
These arguments rest on empirical speculations. Thus, their success
depends ultimately on the empirical truth of those speculations. Since there
is insufﬁcient space here to address this issue, let us simply assume for the
moment that they are sound. Due to our poor range of institutional op-
tions, should the state refrain from criminalizing breaches of preventive
regulations? In the absence of an optimal solution, must (say) offenses of
weapon possession be abolished? It is doubtful that they must. Ideally, one
might prefer a noncensuring response to such conduct. But this ideal
option is not necessarily the only permissible option. Under nonideal insti-
tutional conditions, criminalization might be acceptable as a nonideal solu-
tion. Indeed, the only material difference between criminal and
noncriminal forms of preventive regulation, as they have been conceptu-
alized here, is the former’s use of censuring sanctions. And as we have seen,
at least some measure of censure may be an appropriate response to regu-
latory breaches.
All of this suggests that there is no clear-cut case for the view that the
criminal law should never be used as a tool of preventive regulation. This is
not to say, however, that we do not have reasons for caution in deploying
regulatory rationales for criminalization. Such rationales will often depend
on ﬁne judgments about the appropriate balance between liberty and
security. And it is possible to conﬂate the culpability of causing or risking
harm with the culpability of breaching a regulation aimed at preventing
that harm. These, indeed, are the salient objections to some of the provi-
sions analyzed above. It might not be decisive against section 58, for exam-
ple, that it targets conduct that does not directly risk any terrorist harm.
But as we saw, this is nevertheless an egregious offense, the small marginal
security beneﬁts of which come at a great cost to citizens’ liberties. In
102. See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF
DESERT, ch. 9 (2013).
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recognizing regulatory rationales, scholars must simply become more at-
tuned to criticisms of this latter kind.
CONCLUS IONS
The criminal law’s preventive ambitions are not always easily reconciled
with its retributive character. Although criminal offenses may aim to pre-
vent harm, legislators must not lose sight of the fact that criminalization
entails liability to censure and punishment. According to skeptical com-
mentators, it follows that we should doubt the legitimacy of offenses that
aim to prevent harm by targeting conduct that does not directly cause or
risk causing that harm. This article has argued, however, that the skeptics’
view is unsound. Prelegal wrongs—including wrongs of risking—are not
the only sorts of wrongs that properly interest the criminal law. Rather, we
should conceive of at least some preventive offenses as (putative) mala
prohibita, that is, as exercises of the state’s regulatory authority, aimed at
preventive goals that could not otherwise be achieved at an acceptable cost.
Skeptics might respond that the state lacks strong reasons to censure the
conduct targeted by such offenses through the criminal law. Even if this is
true, however, it is not decisive against such offenses. The criminal law is
unique in its punitive capacity, as well as its censuring capacity. In the
absence of any noncriminal form of regulation, aptness for penalization
thus entails aptness for criminalization. Of course, it does not follow from
this that we generally lack reasons for caution about preventive offenses.
The recent trend for such offenses has doubtless led to many provisions
that fail to strike an appropriate balance between liberty and security. This
article has hopefully shown, however, that at least some offenses potentially
emerge unscathed from the skeptics’ critique. For example, although pos-
sessing weapons does not yet impose risks of their use, there remains
a sound case to be made for the criminalization of such conduct. Breaching
preventive regulations of this sort may, all things considered, warrant both
censure and penalization through the criminal law.
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